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“LESSONS” CONFIRMED WHILE SERVING AS
ARBITRATOR AND COUNSEL IN ARBITRATIONS
INVOLVING AFRICA
Charles N. Brower∗
Michael P. Daly∗∗
Sarah Melikian∗∗∗
In his 2001 book, International Commercial Arbitration and African
States: Practice, Participation and Institutional Development, Dr. Amazu A.
Asouzu of King’s College, London, examined the positive impacts that
arbitration could have on Africa.1
At the same time, however, he identified reservations that many African
nations held regarding international arbitration:
•
•
•
•

International disputes would take place in venues outside of
Africa;
There were not enough experienced arbitrators from the region;
Arbitration was expensive; and
The disparities between different cultural, legal and economic
systems were too great.2

Dr. Asouzu noted that these perceptions “led to a feeling of suspicion, general
lack of confidence, hostility and opposition to the arbitral process.”3

∗ Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague; Judge ad hoc, International Court of Justice,
The Hague; and member of 20 Essex Street Chambers, London. This text is adapted from a keynote speech
given by Judge Charles N. Brower in Atlanta on November 3, 2014 at the “Conference on Africa Related
International Arbitration” hosted by the Atlanta International Arbitration Society. All references to the first
person in this article are to Judge Charles N. Brower.
∗∗ Law Clerk to Judge Charles N. Brower and Visiting Scholar at George Washington University; Former
Legal Adviser at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague.
∗∗∗Associate Legal Officer, Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia; former Legal Adviser to Judge Charles N. Brower at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The
views expressed herein are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
International Tribunal or the United Nations in general.
1 See, e.g., AMAZU A. ASOUZU, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN STATES:
PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 47–50 (2001).
2 See id. at 49–50; Michael Tselentis QC, International Commercial Arbitration and the Southern
African Development Community, 22 ADVOC. 31, 32 (2009).
3 ASOUZU, supra note 1, at 412.
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According to some recent statistics, such distrust recedes but slowly. As of
2013, only ten of the continent’s fifty-four countries had adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law.4 And though almost all countries on the continent
have entered into at least one bilateral investment treaty (BIT), nearly half of
them have entered into just ten or fewer BITs.5
On the other hand, there is solid evidence that international arbitration
increasingly is gaining traction in Africa. Either the New York Convention, the
ICSID Convention, or both, are now in force for the majority of African
States.6 The number of intra-African BITs is also on the rise, with 145 signed
as of 2013, though not all are yet in force.7 The last decades have witnessed a
marked increase in ICSID proceedings involving African states as well.
Having gone from six ICSID cases involving Africa in the 1970s, the numbers
rose to ten cases in the 1980s and fourteen cases in the 1990s, then exploded to
thirty-nine new cases between 2000 and 2009, and thirty new cases between
2010 and 2013.8 Similarly, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague
recently indicated that of its ninety-seven pending cases, eighteen, or
approaching twenty percent, involve one or more parties from Africa.9
We have also seen an expansion of arbitration events, centers, conferences,
and organizations in Africa, including:
•
•
•

New LCIA and PCA offices in Mauritius following the passage in
2008 of the Mauritius International Arbitration Act;10
The establishment of the Kigali International Arbitration Center
and its International Arbitration Conference;11
The inaugural East Africa International Arbitration Conference
held in July 2014 in Nairobi;12 and

4 They are Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. See ARBITRATION IN AFRICA: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 479–80 (Lise Bosman ed., 2013).
5 See id. at 461–62.
6 See id. at 481–82.
7 See id. at 449–50.
8 See id. at 463–67.
9 PCA Holds Hearing in Mauritius, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/shownewsc2b2.
html?ac=view&nws_id=416&pag_id=1261 (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).
10 LCIA-MIAC Arbitration Centre, LCIA-MIAC, http://www.lcia-miac.org/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015);
Services Under the Mauritius International Arbitration Act, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage9a4c.html?pag_id=1492 (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).
11 Kigali International Arbitration Centre News and Highlights, KIGALI INT’L ARB. CTR., http://www.
kiac.org.rw/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2015).
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The third biennial Mauritius International Arbitration Conference
took place in December 2014, and in 2016 Mauritius will become
the first African country to host the ICCA Congress.13

Various investment opportunities in the continent were recently front-page
news items here at home as well. In the summer of 2014, the U.S.-Africa
Leaders’ Summit hosted by President Obama in Washington, D.C. brought
together leaders of forty-five African States to discuss trade and investment.14
Among other things, President Obama announced $12 billion in new funding
for the Administration’s “Power Africa” initiative and $14 billion in new
investments by U.S. companies in Africa, including $5 billion from Atlanta’s
own Coca-Cola.15
Following this overview of growth in African arbitration, I would like to
offer a few anecdotes from my own experiences serving as counsel or
arbitrator in disputes involving African States. By no means are my stories
unique to Africa. They do provide, however, some confirmation from my own
work with African States of four practical “lessons” I have learned that are
universally applicable.
I. LESSON ONE: BE VERY CAREFUL IN CHOOSING YOUR LOCAL PARTNER!
In 1999, I was appointed by Tanzania Electric Supply Company
(TANESCO) to hear an ICSID dispute between it and a company called
Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL). The arbitration focused on a
Power Purchase Agreement between the two entities concerning an electricity
generating facility in Tegeta, Tanzania. You may be wondering why this case
landed at ICSID. TANESCO was wholly owned by the Government, and
IPTL, while incorporated in Tanzania, was seventy percent owned and
controlled by a Malaysian investment company named “Mechmar,” which had
12 The East Africa International Arbitration Conference, Nairobi (28th–29th July 2014) Save the Date!,
E. AFR. CHAMBER COM., INDUSTRY & AGRIC., http://www.labfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/programme.
pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).
13 See About the Mauritius International Arbitration Conference, MAURITIUS INT’L ARB. CONF., http://
www.miac.mu (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); Welcome Message from the Chairman of the Host Committee of the
ICCA Mauritius 2016, ICCA, http://www.iccamauritius2016.com/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
14 Michael Bloomberg & Penny Pritzker, Obama’s U.S.-Africa Forum Will Catalyze $14 Billion in
Business Deals, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/08/05/obamasu-s-africa-forum-will-catalyze-14-billion-in-business-deals/.
15 Mark Landler, African Leaders Sit Down With American Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/world/africa/african-leaders-sit-down-with-american-investors.html?module=
Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A10%22%7D.
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partnered with a Tanzanian engineering firm called “VIPEM.”16 For purposes
of consenting to the jurisdiction of ICSID, the Parties had agreed that IPTL
was a “foreign-controlled entity” pursuant to Article 25(2)(b) of the
Convention.17 The relations between Mechmar and VIPEM, which I will return
to in a moment, became the focal point of my “lesson” from this case.
The Tribunal issued a Final Award in 2001 with several appendices
outlining the respective rights and obligations of the parties under the Power
Purchase Agreement. Among other things, the parties, once those rights and
obligations had been determined by the Tribunal, agreed on the resulting
“Financial Model” that would determine monthly “capacity payments”
TANESCO would make to IPTL.18 That model was incorporated into the
dispositif of our award.19
Seven years later, IPTL submitted an application for interpretation of our
Award. TANESCO had now taken the position that the Financial Model
regulating its monthly payments was invalid because it had been based on
IPTL having been funded thirty percent by equity and seventy percent by debt,
whereas IPTL had funded the equity portion of the project with a shareholder’s
loan from Mechmar, which in turn had been funded by a loan to Mechmar
from Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) in Hong Kong. IPTL disputed that this
aspect of its financing should come as any surprise to TANESCO, since IPTL
had disclosed all of its financial statements in the underlying arbitration which
detailed its loans and shareholdings—that is, before TANESCO agreed to the
Financial Model contained in the Award.
Behind the scenes, trouble had been brewing within IPTL for quite some
time. Already in 2002, the non-controlling thirty percent Tanzanian
shareholder in the joint venture, VIPEM, had filed a petition to wind up IPTL.
The Malaysian investor, Mechmar, responded by commencing an LCIA
arbitration against VIPEM to enjoin VIPEM from pursuing the Tanzanian
wind-up proceedings. Mechmar obtained a favorable ruling from the LCIA
tribunal, the enforcement of which, however, was refused by Tanzanian courts.

16 The full corporate names are Mechmar Corporation and VIP Engineering & Marketing Limited. See
Tanz. Elec. Supply Co. Ltd. v. Indep. Power Tanz. Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8, Final Award, ¶¶ 1–2, 13
(July 12, 2001), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC578_En&caseId=C174.
17 Id. ¶ 10.
18 Id. ¶¶ 53, 64, app. F ¶ 1.
19 See id. ¶ 25.
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Clearly aware of the shareholder disagreement within IPTL, TANESCO
(the Respondent in the ICSID interpretation proceeding) argued that IPTL had
no standing to file the interpretation request because VIPEM had never signed
off on a corporate board resolution authorizing it to do so. It seems that the
agreement between Mechmar and VIPEM gave VIPEM a degree of veto
power. The parties’ dispute over IPTL’s right to initiate the interpretation
proceeding dragged on for many months, with SCB seeking to pursue the case
in place of IPTL as its assignee under the Power Purchase Agreement, which
assignment had been triggered by TANESCO’s not making its contractually
stipulated “capacity payments” to IPTL and IPTL’s consequent default on its
loan from that bank. Eventually, the interpretation proceeding had to be
abandoned.
SCB continued to seek to get its money back via TANESCO before two
other ICSID tribunals. It failed in one case on jurisdictional grounds, but it
obtained a favorable Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability in its other ICSID
case against TANESCO. But, the Tribunal limited its decision to declaratory
relief, however, and the Tanzanian courts have not enforced the decision.20
Clearly the Malaysian investor had not foreseen that its local partner would
become its adversary.
From what I understand, the saga of this case continues. According to local
news sources, there is a major ongoing dispute over funds that the Government
had been paying into an escrow account for IPTL under the Power Purchase
Agreement during their later dispute. The Government is now conducting
investigations into the allegation that senior Government officials fraudulently
authorized payment of $122 million of public funds from that escrow account
to a company named Pan Africa Power, which purchased VIPEM’s thirty
percent share in IPTL.21

20 See Douglas Thomson, Panel Demurs on Damages in Tanzania Power Claim, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32488/panel-demurs-damages-tanzaniapower-claim/; ICSID Throws Out Tanzania Claim, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://
globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/31072/icsid-throws-tanzania-claim/.
21 See Donors Delay Some Aid to Tanzania Over Graft Claims, BUS. RECORDER (Oct. 12, 2014), http://
www.brecorder.com/business-a-economy/189/1232038/; Dutch Lawyer Urges State to Clarify on Escrow
Account, ALLAFRICA (Oct. 23, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201410231040.html; IPTL Owns ‘All’ in BoT
Escrow Account–Claim, ALLAFRICA (Oct. 15, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201410150384.html.
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II. LESSON TWO: SOMETIMES IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET A HOST STATE TO
SETTLE, EVEN AFTER IT HAS AGREED TO DO SO
My second lesson arose in two cases. The first was an ICSID arbitration in
which I served as counsel for the Claimant. The New York bank,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, often referred to as “Manny Hanny,”
had obtained a license to operate a branch bank in an Egyptian Free Zone in
1975.22 Five years later, Egypt’s General Authority for Investment and Free
Zones (GAIFZ) changed its regulations so as to increase certain “added value”
duty payments applicable to the bank. When Manny Hanny refused to pay the
new fees, the General Authority sued the bank, and the litigation wended its
way through the Egyptian court system. Ultimately, the Egyptian courts
rejected Manny Hanny’s argument that they should decline jurisdiction in
recognition of the ICSID Convention’s Article 26, which provides that
ICSID’s jurisdiction is “to the exclusion of any other remedy.”23 This
argument was based on the availability to Manny Hanny of ICSID jurisdiction
pursuant to a standing consent provided in Egypt’s Foreign Investment Law.
Manny Hanny called upon me to represent it before ICSID, and we
proceeded to file a Request for Arbitration against both Egypt itself and the
GAIFZ. Due to the failure of Egypt to appear, though the GAIFZ did, it was a
year before the Tribunal could be constituted, with ICSID itself having to
appoint both an arbitrator for the Egyptian Respondents and a Tribunal
President.
The very next day, I submitted a request for provisional measures and
temporary restraining measures pursuant to Article 47 of the ICSID
Convention recommending that the Respondents cease and desist from
pursuing the related municipal proceedings. The Tribunal agreed with us,
recommending a suspension of the local Egyptian court proceedings, a
conclusion which it later reconfirmed when we were forced to renew our
request. Ultimately, the Tribunal issued a decision in 1991 upholding its
jurisdiction.
Having prevailed in the jurisdictional phase of the dispute, my client and
the GAIFZ agreed to settle for the amount my client had always maintained

22

Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/89/1 (unpublished decision).
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
art. 26, Oct. 14, 1966, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/2006%20CRR_
English-final.pdf.
23

BROWER_DALY_MELIKIAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

LESSONS CONFIRMED

11/9/2015 2:37 PM

11

was the proper one owed to the GAIFZ. That settlement became stymied,
however, due to lower functionaries within the GAIFZ insisting that about
$40,000 in interest also be paid as a condition of the deal. Fortunately, a law
school classmate of mine happened to be the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt at the
time, and at my request he placed a call to the Prime Minister, following which
that precondition disappeared and we concluded the settlement.
But that was not the end of the matter. You may recall that a decision
confirming ICSID jurisdiction is not subject to annulment based on Article 52
of the Convention, which applies only to “awards,” and not to “decisions.” The
Egyptian Government, therefore, was well aware that the Jurisdictional
Decision in this case could not be annulled as it had lost a similar battle several
years earlier, in April of 1988, in the famous “Egyptian Pyramids” or SPP
case.24 Following the jurisdictional decision in that case, Egypt had tried to file
an Application for Annulment, but ICSID’s Secretary-General, Dr. Ibrahim
Shihata, refused to register the Application.25 So, you can imagine my surprise
upon receiving a call from the Secretary of the ICSID Tribunal, Antonio Parra,
after we had already settled, informing me that representatives of the Egyptian
Government were in his office in Washington, DC to present an Application
for Annulment in our case. It eventually came to light that two senior Egyptian
civil servants who were on the verge of retirement had written themselves
orders to deliver the Application so that they could visit the United States for
the first, and presumably the last, time. The moral of the story: Expect the
unexpected when bargaining over settlement with State officials.
The second African case that confirmed this lesson is Foresti v. Republic of
South Africa. The dispute was highly publicized and could have turned into a
true “blockbuster.” Seven Italian citizens and their Luxembourg company that
mined dimensional stone—marble, granite, and the like—in South Africa had
filed an ICSID claim challenging post-apartheid South African legislation
requiring mining investors to sell twenty-six percent of their shareholdings to
“historically disadvantaged South Africans” and ensure that forty percent of
their management operations were performed by members of the same group.26

24 See S. Pac. Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3,
Award on the Merits, ¶ 24 (May 20, 1992), 8 ICSID REV. 328 (1993) (recounting details of its unpublished
Decision on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction dated Apr. 14, 1988).
25 Id. ¶ 26.
26 Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, ¶¶ 1, 56 (Aug. 4, 2010),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC165
1_En&caseId=C90.
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It was a case sharply posing potential conflicts between international
investment law and human rights laws. The nature of the controversy attracted
the attention of several non-governmental organizations, which joined the
proceedings as non-disputing parties, something that resulted in some
scholarship about public interest intervention in arbitration.27
In fact, however, we never reached the merits. Instead, the parties ended up
cutting a deal on their own in which the Claimants would be deemed to be in
compliance with the South African equity divestiture laws by signing an
“Offset Agreement.” By that agreement the Claimants undertook to employ
additional “historically disadvantaged South Africans” in the beneficiation of
the mined stones, and to provide for a five percent employee ownership
program.28
Thinking that the matter was closed, Claimants sought to discontinue the
proceedings in November 2009.29 The Respondent, however, refused to
consent to a discontinuance, which consent was required by Article 50 of
ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules, unless the Claimant would pay all of its
legal fees of €5.3 million.30
What followed was a historically unique procedure in which the Tribunal
was tasked with determining which party had “prevailed” in the arbitration for
purposes of a costs award even though the parties had specifically withdrawn
the merits from the Tribunal’s consideration. What a “Catch 22”! How could
we determine the “degree” of each party’s success in the case, so as to assess
costs, when our mandate now precluded us from ruling on the merits? What
the Claimants must have expected to be a routine discontinuance was
transformed into a three-day hearing in the Peace Palace in The Hague
exclusively on costs.31 Among other things, the parties raised a number of
arguments about an alleged request for a bribe from a member of Respondent’s
legal team to procure the Government to drop its insistence on costs.32 In the
end, the Tribunal ordered the Claimants to pay a small fraction of
Respondent’s legal fees (€400,000 out of €5.3 million) and that was finally the

27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. ¶¶ 25–28.
Id. ¶ 79.
Id.
Id. ¶ 81.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
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end of the matter.33 Once again, expect the unexpected when it comes to
settlement with Host States.
III. LESSON THREE: SOMETIMES A HOST STATE CAN BE PERSUADED TO STAY
ITS HAND
The next case I will address concerns a salt facility in the Ada-Songor
Lagoon region of Ghana. A Ghanaian company called Vacuum Salt Products
Limited appointed me to the ICSID Tribunal hearing its claims against the
Government for allegedly expropriating its contractual rights in a saltgathering facility. Because Vacuum Salt was incorporated in Ghana,
jurisdiction was entirely premised on the theory that the company was
“foreign-controlled,” as required by Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention,
by a Greek national who had moved to Ghana in 1942 amidst World War II.34
After incorporating his business, however, the foreign investor progressively
had transferred eighty percent of the company shares to Ghanaian banks and
private citizens.35 He had retained only twenty percent of the shares and had no
rights to block corporate actions or otherwise exercise managerial control over
the entity.36 Thus, the case became well-known as the first ICSID dispute to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction ratione personae—something many people at
the time considered inconceivable, based on the belief that arbitrators would
never decline jurisdiction as that would be contrary to their own financial
interests.
The real lesson to be taken from the Ghana case, however, relates to
something less well-known. The Respondent had appointed to the Tribunal Dr.
Kamal Hossain, the famous Bangladeshi jurist and statesman, and together the
two of us had agreed upon Judge Sir Robert Jennings, at the time the President
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to serve as our Tribunal President.
Some time after accepting his appointment, however, Judge Jennings informed
us that he would not be able to preside over any substantive oral hearings, all
of which were to be held in the Peace Palace in The Hague, until he had
completed his tenure as President at the ICJ, which would not occur for
another sixteen months.37
33

Id. ¶¶ 119, 133.
Vacuum Salt Prod. Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/92/1, Award, ¶¶ 28, 41 (Feb. 16,
1994), 9 ICSID REV. 72 (1994).
35 Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
36 See id. ¶¶ 43 nn.20, 53.
37 Id. ¶ 10.
34
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This put us into a sticky predicament, since the Claimant already had filed a
Request for Provisional Measures less than two weeks after the Tribunal had
been constituted, thus requiring a hearing right away.38 Judge Jennings’ first
instinct was to resign from the Tribunal, but we convinced him otherwise, as
such an act at the time would impair the integrity of the ICSID proceeding.
Instead, Dr. Hossain and I held a hearing over which I presided, based on
ICSID Arbitration Rule 17, because ICSID had received my acceptance of
appointment before it had received Dr. Hossain’s.39 This twist of fate placed
me in a key role in navigating Claimant’s Provisional Measures Request,
which again concerned whether or not the Claimant would have to submit to
municipal proceedings in Ghana relating to its cancelled project.40
To me, provisional measures clearly were required, exactly as in the
Egyptian case to which I referred earlier, since ICSID jurisdiction is expressly
exclusive under Article 26 of the Convention. As I tried to broker such a
compromise at the hearing, a valuable lesson emerged: Sometimes a Host State
may be persuaded to stay its hand. Recall that by this early stage in the
arbitration, Ghana had already announced its intention to challenge the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal based on the foreign Claimant’s actual lack of
control.41 I asked counsel for Ghana whether the Respondent might be willing
voluntarily to defer the local proceedings while the arbitration was pending,
rather than being ordered to do so. I strongly suggested—and glanced
meaningfully at Claimant’s counsel while doing so—that the Claimant likely
would be amenable to such an arrangement. The parties accepted the
proposal42 and, at least for the time being, we avoided having to rule on the
provisional measures request without Judge Jennings.43
There are other cases in which a Host State has been willing to stay its
hand. In Millicom v. Senegal, for example, the Respondent adopted a
cooperative attitude and agreed to postpone local litigation in Senegalese

38

Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 15.
40 Id. ¶ 11.
41 Id. ¶ 12.
42 Id. ¶ 16.
43 The Award does state that the Claimant renewed its Request for Provisional Measures, and the
Tribunal declined to recommend those measures in a decision issued on June 14, 1993. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22. No
further information on the nature of the second request or the Tribunal’s ruling is provided in the Award.
39
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courts relating to the same concession as was at issue in the ICSID
arbitration.44
IV. LESSON FOUR: YOU MAY GET LUCKY WHEN A PROJECT FALLS APART
The last case I will discuss concerns a copper and cobalt tailings processing
facility in the Katanga Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). Unlike the previous cases I have mentioned—all of which were ICSID
cases—this was an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) case. The three
companies45 listed as Claimants in our case had entered into a series of
contracts permitting them to use a new metallurgical process to derive cobalt
and copper from remnants (so called “tailings”) of previous extraction efforts
in the DRC. The real owner, holding a majority stake in the project, was a
Canadian company named First Quantum Minerals. Litigation in the DRC
ensued when the Government established a Revisitation Commission to review
all mining contracts between foreign investors and the DRC to ensure that
Congolese mines would “fully and truly benefit” the Congolese nation. The
Commission recommended repealing the decree authorizing the project, the
Minister of Mines terminated the relevant contracts, and the Congolese police
closed and sealed the project offices and work sites. The Claimants initiated
the ICC proceedings after the High Court of Kinshasa had dismissed their
claims for relief, the Court of Appeal had affirmed the dismissal, and the DRC
separately had obtained a $12 billion judgment from its courts against First
Quantum’s subsidiaries for allegedly damaging the country’s reputation in the
international mining world.
The Claimants first obtained an order of provisional measures from our
ICC Tribunal and then were gearing up for a merits hearing when the case
settled very suddenly. Having received $1.25 billion as the price to leave the
project, the Claimants had gotten one of the largest recoveries by any Claimant
before an international tribunal in a dispute against a sovereign State without
even establishing liability. You may be asking yourself: What brought about
the Claimants’ good fortune? From where did the funds come? The driving
force behind the settlement was a company from Kazakhstan named Eurasian
Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC) that “magically” had succeeded to all
44 Millicom Int’l Operations B.V. v. Republic of Sen., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/20, Decision on
Application for Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 18, 45(b), 49(b), 52(1) (Dec. 9, 2009), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2832_En&caseId=C500.
45 The three companies were Congo Mineral Developments Limited (CMD), Industrial Development
Corporation of South Africa Limited (IDC), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
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of First Quantum’s rights in the very same project. As part of a global
settlement that would extinguish the ICC case, a parallel ICSID case,46 and
several ancillary court proceedings, ENRC provided the Claimants with a $750
million cash payment along with a three-year promissory note for $500
million.47 The moral of the story? Your problem may be solved by those who
may have caused it in the first place.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
So there you have it—the “four lessons.” I hope that this eclectic group of
“war stories” has provided you with some entertainment. I conclude my
remarks by repeating that the lessons emerging from these “snapshots” of my
own experiences over the years with cases involving African States are by no
means distinct to Africa. As I said when I began, these lessons, I can assure
you, are of universal applicability. The joys and perils of an active arbitration
practice remain universal regardless of the continent involved. I wish you all
the very best of luck in this most fascinating and intellectually challenging
field of practicing law. Thank you.
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